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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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Redemption: A Case Study in Insurgency Analysis

by

Derek R. Fix

LCDR, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract

Insurgency is one of the most difficult challenges confronting operational leaders and planners across the range of military operations. A comprehensive analysis of an insurgency is a critical first step of any operational design to counter such a threat. By utilizing Southern conservative resistance to Republican Reconstruction governments from 1865-1877 as a case study, this paper will demonstrate the efficacy of such an approach both for identifying possible critical vulnerabilities in an insurgency that may be exploited, as well as draw lessons learned that may be valuable in contemporary operations.

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Introduction

Bard O' Neill defines insurgency as "a struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics."¹ History is replete with such struggles, and the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are no different. Since World War II guerilla warfare and terrorism have become the most common forms of political violence, and between 1969 and 1985 the number of terrorist incidents jumped from 200 per year to 800.² U.S. forces are currently engaged in combating insurgencies simultaneously in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States is also confronting a global, transnational insurgent threat from Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in the context of the Global War on Terror.³

Because of the prevalence of insurgency in today's security environment, operational planners must be able to solve such challenges across the range of military operations. Though no two insurgencies are exactly alike, a comprehensive analysis is a critical first step in developing a solution for an insurgency. By breaking an insurgency down into its requisite parts, one can begin to formulate solutions by comparison to historical insurgencies or by devising new solutions unique to the situation. By utilizing Southern conservative resistance to Federal Reconstruction from 1865-1877 and subsequent Redemption as a case study, this paper will demonstrate the efficacy of such an analysis in understanding the nature of an insurgency in order to exploit critical vulnerabilities as well as identify lessons applicable to contemporary operations.

¹ Bard O' Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse (Washington: Potomac Books, 2005), 15.

² Ibid., 1-2.

³ See David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4.

Frameworks for Analyzing Insurgency

Before one can analyze an insurgency, a framework of reference is necessary. Unfortunately, many of the tools available to operational planners are not ideally suited for the task. Joint publications that deal with insurgency are not robust, and frameworks for analysis provided do not deal specifically with insurgency.⁴ Current planning tools such as the Commander's Estimate of the Situation (CES) were largely designed for understanding similar adversaries and defeating them in conventional military operations.⁵ Though such planning tools may be helpful in understanding conventional military problems, their usefulness may not be as great when applied to the problem of insurgency. Because an insurgency is not primarily a military problem, understanding a specific insurgency requires a clear analysis of the social, economic, and political components that are at its root.⁶ Once the parts of an insurgency are understood, planners can begin to design a campaign to solve these issues. In order to do so they must have a framework for analysis.

One framework suggested for the analysis of insurgency is a systems perspective. In "Analyzing Insurgency," Colonel John D. Waghelstein and Dr. Donald Chisolm provide such an analytic framework for asking practical questions about insurgency in the following specific categories: underlying issues, underlying characteristics, catalyst, organization, support, force and coercion, legitimacy, and history.⁷ Such an analysis is useful for both understanding a specific insurgency, as well as for comparative analysis of other insurgencies.

⁴ See Joint Publications 3-07 and 3-07.1

⁵ Colonel John D. Waghelstein and Dr. Donald Chisolm, "Analyzing Insurgency" Naval War College, February 2006, 1.

⁶ Ibid., 2.

⁷ Waghelstein and Chisolm, 6-11.

In Insurgency and Terrorism, Bard O' Neill proposes a similar framework for analyzing insurgency. The categories for analysis of an insurgency include: type of insurgency, insurgent strategy, insurgent techniques, environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and government response.⁸ This framework provides another useful method for understanding insurgency.

Historic Background

Prior to Robert E. Lee's surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox, Longstreet's artillery chief E.P. Alexander approached Lee with an idea to avoid surrender and continue the war by other means. Alexander proposed the men break up with their arms into small groups and continue resistance.⁹ Lee, however, realized the implications of such a course of action stating, "We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from."¹⁰ Though Lee's decision to surrender his army at Appomattox helped ensure resistance would not be carried on by other means, within a few years the South would see a concerted campaign of political coercion and violence directed at Reconstruction governments.

Federal Reconstruction policy toward the South began to be formulated on an ad hoc basis as Union Armies began to conquer parts of the Confederacy. Parts of Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Virginia had been under Union control since 1862. Executive instructions to military governors provided some general guidelines, however imperfect.¹¹ After assuming the Presidency following Lincoln's assassination in April, Andrew Johnson waited until May 1865 to announce his first reconstruction policies. The first proclamation

⁸ O' Neill, 209-211.

⁹ Douglas Southall Freeman, Robert E. Lee Vol. IV (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), 122.

¹⁰ Ibid., 123.

¹¹ James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1968), 6.

Johnson made offered amnesty to those who took an oath of allegiance, excepting such categories of persons as Confederate civil officials, army officers over the rank of colonel, and persons owning taxable property over twenty thousand dollars.¹² Johnson's second proclamation began the naming of provisional governors and directed them to call an election of delegates to state constitutional conventions.¹³ Thus began the period known as Presidential Reconstruction.

During this Presidential period of Reconstruction, the essential elements required of states for readmission to the Union basically entailed renouncing the doctrine of secession, acceptance of emancipation, repudiation of war debts, and swearing of the loyalty oath.¹⁴ Despite such seemingly generous terms, many Southern states began to pass Black Codes in attempts to control the now free labor force, and they resisted any attempts to implement black suffrage. The initial delegates elected to Congress by former Confederate states did nothing to placate Republican fears of an unrepentant South. Ten had been Confederate generals, nine had served in the Confederate Congress, and one, Alexander Stephens, had been Vice President of the Confederacy.¹⁵ Disagreements over President Johnson's reconstruction policies and perceptions of recalcitrant Southern attitudes led the Republican congress to assert itself.

Beginning in 1866 Congress passed a Civil Rights Bill and Revised Freedmen's Bureau Bill over Presidential veto, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment which granted citizenship to former slaves.¹⁶ In February 1867 Congress passed the First Reconstruction

¹² James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992), 496.

¹³ Ibid., 496.

¹⁴ Dan T. Carter, When the War Was Over: The Failure of Self-Reconstruction in the South, 1865-1867 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1985), 28.

¹⁵ Ibid., 228-230.

¹⁶ McPherson, 513.

Act. This bill declared the existing governments of the ten unrepresented Southern states illegal (Tennessee had been readmitted in 1866), and divided the South into five military districts under command of an army general.¹⁷ A second Reconstruction Act required the commanders of military districts to register eligible voters for new state constitutional conventions, while a third act subordinated provisional governments to military rule and broadened disenfranchisement.¹⁸ These acts changed the entire balance of political power in the former Confederate states. Freedmen became the majority of voters in five states, while an estimated ten to fifteen percent of the white electorate was disenfranchised by the Reconstruction Acts.¹⁹ As the Reconstruction Acts and black suffrage shifted the political balance to Republicans, white Southern Democrats began to turn to other means to undermine Republican power.

Analyzing the Southern Insurgency

Approximately 260,000 Confederate soldiers, roughly one-fifth of the male population, lost their lives during the Civil War, and naturally many Southerners felt bitterness toward the North. As one southern planter expressed his enmity toward the North, “I have vowed that if I should have children- the first ingredient of the first principle of their education shall be uncompromising hatred and contempt of the Yankee.”²⁰ The period song “Good Ole Rebel” voiced the unrepentant attitude felt by many, especially the last sentence of the chorus “I don’t axe no pardon, for what I was or am; I won’t be Reconstructed, and I don’t give a damn!”²¹ Though such sentiments reflected anger over the war’s outcome, the

¹⁷ Sefton, 109.

¹⁸ McPherson, 520, 524.

¹⁹ Ibid., 530.

²⁰ McPherson, 492.

²¹ Stetson Kennedy, After Appomattox: How the South Won the War (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1995), 25.

violence directed at Republicans and freed blacks had political motives. By analyzing this violence as an insurgency, one can discern possible vulnerabilities that may have been exploited by Republicans to minimize its effects.

One of the first steps in analyzing an insurgency is to determine its type and its underlying issues. The Southern insurgency was a preservationist insurgency to remove Radical Republican rule as well as maintain white political, economic, and social supremacy. Black suffrage was one of the biggest issues of contention. A Louisiana paper in 1868 stated, “We proclaim that we are opposed to negro suffrage under any circumstances, and stand ready to use all legitimate means to prevent its present and future exercise.”²² As long as freed blacks voted Republican, Democrats would be out of power.

Another grievance of many whites, especially of the planter class, had to do with economics and the problem of dealing with labor issues. The war was an economic disaster for many white Southerners. On average Southern whites’ wealth was reduced by 50 percent, while the planter class saw its wealth decline by as much as 75-95 percent.²³ Apart from the adverse economic effects of the war, emancipation changed the entire fabric of labor in the Southern economy. Georgia state delegate John Chappell expressed such grievances when he said that emancipation “renders our lands comparatively valueless, subverts our whole system of labor, and ruins the very fabric of society.”²⁴

Land ownership was a key economic issue. In 1865 William T. Sherman issued his Special Order No. 15 reserving the Sea Islands and a portion of the South Carolina low

²² Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), xl.

²³ William L. Barney, Battleground for the Union: The Era of Civil War and Reconstruction, 1848-1877, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1990), 274.

²⁴ Carter, 84.

country for black settlement.²⁵ Though this order raised freedmen's expectations, the reality fell far short. In September 1865 Circular 15 from the White House ordered the return of all the 850,000 acres of confiscated land in the Freedmen's Bureau's possession to pardoned owners.²⁶ Determined to maintain political and economic power, many planters resolved not to rent or sell any land to freedmen. A. Warren Kelsey, an observer sent to the South by Northern textile manufacturers, found planters believed "that so long as they retain possession of their lands they can oblige the negroes to work on such terms as they please."²⁷

Closely related to the land issue was that of labor. Many white plantation owners attempted to reorganize their labor forces much the same as they had existed prior to the war with the exception of wages. Many freedmen desired a degree of economic independence and preferred share cropping to wage labor. Hundreds of blacks refused to sign labor contracts and left plantations causing the black population of the ten largest cities in the South to double from 1865-1870.²⁸ In their efforts to control the black labor force, Southern planters found unlikely allies in the U.S. Army and the Freedmen's Bureau. Many Northern Republicans and Bureau officers held unrealistic views regarding the ease with which the slave system could transition to free market labor. However, the reality on the ground and the desire to get the Southern economy operating again changed expectations. By the summer of 1865 Army commanders began to issue orders to keep freedmen on plantations to stem the influx into cities, and by 1866 the Bureau had little alternative but to encourage nearly all freedmen to sign labor contracts.²⁹ The desire to maintain control over the black

²⁵ Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, (New York: Harper's & Row, 1988), 70.

²⁶ Ibid., 158-159.

²⁷ Ibid., 134.

²⁸ Ibid., 82, 105.

²⁹ Foner, 154, 164.

labor force was also a cause of violent coercion when other methods failed. A Nashville newspaper in 1867 reported that “regulators...are riding about whipping, maiming and killing all Negroes who do not obey the orders of their former masters, just as if slavery existed.”³⁰

The leadership of the Southern resistance consisted primarily of Democratic Party leaders and the pre-war elite. Though many Democratic leaders may not have participated directly in violent acts, they certainly helped foment violence by constantly vilifying blacks and Republicans. A Georgia Freedmen’s Bureau agent reported that “the most respectable citizens are engaged in it.”³¹ Even those Democratic leaders who did not directly participate tacitly condoned the violence by not speaking out against it. Leaders of violent groups such as the Ku Klux Klan consisted of prominent citizens including former Confederate generals such as Nathan Bedford Forrest and John B. Gordon.

The rank and file who committed most of the violent acts consisted generally of white Democrats from all classes. The maintenance of white supremacy tended to transcend class boundaries. Young men comprised the great majority of Klansmen, and many were Confederate veterans. One Georgia Republican said the Klan was composed of “simply young men, with plenty of leisure on their hands, and with a great love of adventure in their souls.”³²

Identifying the insurgency’s desired end state is also important in the analysis. Though the forms of Southern conservative resistance to Reconstruction took different forms and evolved as the period progressed, the desired end state sought by the movement was much the same whether sought by the Ku Klux Klan or the later self-styled Redeemers. This

³⁰ Foner, 121.

³¹ Ibid., 432.

³² Trelease, 51.

desired end state consisted of overturning Republican rule, reducing the political power of blacks, and changing the Southern legal system to institute labor control and racial subordination.³³

Another important element in the analysis is to understand the insurgency's organization. This task can be difficult, primarily because the organization can adapt and change over time. The situation in the Reconstruction South was no different. The most famous violent group was the Ku Klux Klan. Founded by six young Confederate veterans in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, the Ku Klux Klan eventually spread throughout the South. Because many members of the organization were Confederate veterans, the group was organized at both the state and local levels as a secret semi-military society with such officers as Grand Dragons and Grand Titans.³⁴

Yet despite the outward appearance of a centralized structure, the movement was for all practical purposes decentralized. Many local units sprang from the bottom up in both Tennessee and other Southern states. Similar organizations such as the Knights of the White Camellia in Louisiana and Alabama, the Young Men's Democratic Clubs of Florida, and the Knights of the Rising Sun in Texas sprang up throughout the South.³⁵ Stories of the Klan's exploits in Democratic newspapers contributed to the movement's spread. The actual structure of organized violence thus varied from state to state and also changed as time progressed.

By 1871 the Ku Klux Klan was on the wane following the passage of the Ku Klux Act. In May 1871 President Grant ordered the Army to serve as escorts to Federal marshals

³³ Foner, 588.

³⁴ Trelease, 50.

³⁵ Trelease, 51.

to help make whatever arrests the Federal courts might desire.³⁶ In South Carolina, for example, such enforcement resulted in eighty-two convictions and rendered the Klan ineffective.³⁷ Following the beginnings of Democratic redemption in Virginia and Tennessee in 1869, organization of violent resistance shifted to those states where Republicans still held power. In 1874 the White League became a substantial statewide organization in Louisiana, and its purpose was to disrupt Republican campaigns and prevent blacks from voting by any means necessary.³⁸ This organization's ties with the Democratic Party were much more overt. One historian called the White League "the military arm of the Democratic Party."³⁹ In Mississippi similar White Line organizations began to spring up in 1875.

Determining the type of support an insurgency receives is also important. Support for groups such as the Klan was internal and widespread. In many areas local officials and leading citizens were directly involved. Even those not involved tended to maintain silence out of tacit approval or intimidation. In many cases witnesses were reluctant to testify and fellow Klansmen resorted to perjury to provide alibis, prompting one Florida Republican leader to remark that if "any one of these men is on the jury...you cannot convict."⁴⁰ In many cases Southern women supported the movement by sewing costumes and disguises for members.⁴¹

Another element in the analysis is to identify what elements of force or coercion the insurgency utilizes to achieve its objectives. Groups such as the Ku Klux Klan used coercion primarily to enforce control over black labor or to prevent blacks from voting Republican.

³⁶ Sefton, 224-225.

³⁷ Ibid., 226.

³⁸ Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), 25.

³⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁴⁰ Foner, 434.

⁴¹ Ibid., 435.

Coercion or threats were also directed at white Republicans, but the overwhelming proportion was directed at the black population. Approximately 80 percent of Southern Republican voters were black men, and Southern whites often turned to coercion achieve their political objectives.⁴²

Southern conservative tactics varied from place to place. The Klan utilized psychological terror and threats at first, riding the countryside in disguise to intimidate blacks. The Klan soon turned more violent, typically riding in small groups at night armed with rifles and revolvers. The Freedmen's Bureau in Georgia reported 142 acts of violence directed at blacks and white Republicans from August to October 1868 including 31 killings, 43 shootings, 5 stabbings, 55 beatings, and 8 whippings of 300 to 500 lashes apiece.⁴³ The 1868 elections in Louisiana saw deliberate violence directed at the black population of the state by groups such as the Knights of the White Camellia and other whites. Between the April and November elections 1,081 persons were killed, 135 shot, and 507 otherwise terrorized.⁴⁴ The vote swing between elections illustrates the campaign's effectiveness. Republican votes fell from 61,152 to 34,859 while Democratic votes rose from 43,739 to 88,225.⁴⁵

Another important element in the analysis of insurgency is the question of legitimacy. The issue of legitimacy cuts both ways, as insurgents must promote their own legitimacy while undercutting that of the government. One means of accomplishing this goal is via a concerted information campaign. Southern conservatives excelled in this regard by using the mass media of the nineteenth century, the newspaper. Following the overturn of state

⁴² McPherson, 548.

⁴³ Trelease, 117.

⁴⁴ Trelease, 135.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 136.

governments by the Republican Congress in 1867, Democratic newspapers were the only institution in the hands of white Democrats with which to oppose Reconstruction.⁴⁶ Southern editors helped consolidate opinion against Reconstruction by coining such terms as carpetbagger and scalawag. Carpetbagger became a derisive term for Northern newcomers while scalawag was reserved for Southern white Republicans. Such ideographs helped shape Southerners' views of Reconstruction and contributed to an ideology of resistance.⁴⁷ Not only did Southern newspapers solidify opinion, but they abetted the spread of such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan via their rhetoric. The Democratic press not only minimized the violence inflicted by the group, but also justified the actions of such groups.⁴⁸

Realizing the necessity of undermining Northern opinion to achieve their goals, Southern editors were also mindful of how such reporting played in the Northern press. Southern editors traded columns with their Democratic counterparts in the North, and made repeated use of the term "carpetbagger" when they realized it resonated in the North as well.⁴⁹ For example, the New York Herald blamed "carpet-bag squatters" and "carpet-bag officials" for disruptions during the 1868 Presidential election.⁵⁰ Through their concerted efforts, the Southern Democratic press perhaps did more to undermine the legitimacy of Radical Reconstruction in both the North and the South than any other instrument.

Ultimately Southern resistance to Reconstruction proved successful. Following the Presidential election of 1876, Rutherford B. Hayes removed the last Federal troops from the South as part of the compromise that swept him into power. With Federal protection gone,

⁴⁶ Ted Tunnell, "Creating 'The Propaganda of History': Southern Editors and the Origins of Carpetbagger and Scalawag," The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 72, Iss. 4., 790.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 792.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 820.

⁴⁹ Tunnell, 815.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 816.

the last Republican state governments fell to the “Redeemers.” The ascendant Democratic Party eventually overturned much of what Reconstruction wrought, essentially impeding both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments and solidifying the subordination of the black population. Nearly one hundred years would pass before the promises of Reconstruction were finally fulfilled.

Lessons Learned

Though an exhaustive analysis of Southern resistance to Reconstruction is beyond the scope of this paper, this case study provides an excellent example of how such an exercise is critical to the operational planner in developing possible counterinsurgent strategies. Following the implementation of Congressional Reconstruction in 1867, the desired end state of the United States was to readmit loyal Southern state governments under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments. Such an end state represented an attempt to completely overturn Southern society, and the resulting resistance to Reconstruction yields some important lessons about possible courses of action that were available to the Federal government to thwart this attempt.

The first lesson involves the area of population security, specifically that of blacks and white Republicans. Troops were unable to provide such security due to limited numbers, types of troops available, and also the large expanses of space involved. As violence increased across the South in 1868, the number of U.S. troops had been reduced to only 18,000 for the entire South, the majority of them infantry.⁵¹ Even if the Army had a lead on a possible Klansman, the suspect often was able to flee before the slow moving infantry could arrive. One lieutenant of the Sixteenth Infantry remarked about an effort to apprehend a Klansman in Mississippi that “infantry could not move two miles before the cry ‘Yankees are

⁵¹ Sefton, 207.

coming' would be spread...giving of course ample time for the wicked to flee."⁵² Operations by the Army in South Carolina and by the militia in Tennessee proved greater security was possible. Greater numbers of cavalry and more support for Republican governors who called out the militia by Federal troops may have provided greater protection for the population. An analysis of the insurgents' organization and tactics could have provided insight into the proper numbers and types of troops necessary to help provide security.

Another important lesson yielded by the analysis was the importance of information operations both to increase the legitimacy of the Southern Democrats among their target population, while at the same time working to undermine the legitimacy of Reconstruction in the North. By contrast Republican newspapers in the South never had a wide circulation due to the illiteracy and poverty of many in the party. For example, the average weekly circulation of all Republican newspapers in South Carolina in 1873 was hardly greater than 500 readers.⁵³ Though the term information operations did not exist in the nineteenth century, a more robust information campaign may have helped counter Southern efforts and solidify the legitimacy of Reconstruction.

The most important lesson to be drawn from the analysis is the importance of discerning the underlying political, social, and economic issues involved. Though the military may be needed to provide security initially, military action must be secondary to the political.⁵⁴ Such issues must generally be resolved to establish a durable solution. The analysis of the underlying issues behind Southern conservative resistance points to possible seams that may have been exploited. One such rift that may have been exploited was to play on the class differences of white Democrats. Poor whites had more in common economically

⁵² Sefton, 223-224.

⁵³ Foner, 350.

⁵⁴ David Gallula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 89.

with the former slaves and other Republicans, yet the planter class and other Democratic leaders were able to effectively play upon the race issue to maintain their support. One possible course of action available to Republicans was some sort of Federal economic aid program for the South. Such a program may have eventually convinced white Democrats that joining such government projects was in their economic self-interest, and may have increased loyalty to Republican governments.⁵⁵ Such projects may have expanded the tax base, reduced the pressure on small farmers, and created more economic competition that may have reduced the influence of the Democratic landed aristocracy.⁵⁶ If the majority of poor Southern whites had seen that their economic interests lay in support of the Republican Party, the impact of the Democrat's racial rhetoric may have been lessened.

Another possible course of action may have been a widespread program of land distribution to former slaves. Such a program may have served a two-fold purpose: to weaken the land based economic and political power of the Democratic ruling class and to give the Freedmen a degree of economic freedom that land ownership provides.⁵⁷ Blacks would have been less susceptible to economic coercion, and the labor-based catalyst for some violence directed at blacks would have been removed. Unfortunately President Johnson's order to return confiscated lands to former owners early on in Reconstruction precluded the implementation of such a policy.

Though the authority to implement such programs to address the underlying issues of an insurgency may be beyond that of the operational commander, he can still utilize such an analysis to develop possible courses of action to propose to strategic leaders, government

⁵⁵ Heather Cox Richardson, "A Marshall Plan for the South? The Failure of Republican and Democratic Ideology during Reconstruction," Civil War History, Vol. 51, Iss. 4, 384.

⁵⁶ Richardson, 384.

⁵⁷ Foner, 109-110.

agencies, and policy makers that address these issues. Non-military facets of national power must be included in the operational design to achieve any type of lasting success. Perhaps Union General William T. Sherman understood this concept when he wrote to his brother in September 1865, “No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of people South, we cannot accomplish it by force.”⁵⁸

Conclusion

Though the Redemption movement in the South differs from contemporary insurgency in many respects, it helps illustrate the importance of a thorough analysis in identifying possible courses of action to counter an insurgency, as well as draw out some lessons that are still applicable. Such an analysis is even more critical today. In his article “Counter-insurgency *Redux*,” David Kilcullen argues that although many proven counterinsurgency methods still apply to contemporary operations, the effects of globalization and the transnational nature of the threat among other factors require new approaches to counter it. The implication of his argument is that correctly analyzing the nature of the insurgency in this complex and rapidly changing environment is even more critical.

Recent doctrine appears to understand this fact. The U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency emphasizes the importance of operational design over planning. Design concentrates on understanding the nature of an unfamiliar problem in order to devise a framework for solving it.⁵⁹ Most importantly the document recognizes that it is essential for commanders to designate a dedicated group of analysts, insulated from the short term demands of current operations, to perform a

⁵⁸ Sefton, 254.

⁵⁹ Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 15 December 2006), 4-2.

comprehensive analysis of the insurgency.⁶⁰ Based on the rapidly changing nature of most insurgencies, such a task is crucial for learning and adaptation. The analysis of insurgency and operational design for countering it require the preponderance of effort. Current operational commanders and planners must understand their importance for eventual success.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 3-32.

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